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Abstract Increasing evidence from the empirical economic and psychological literature
suggests that positive and negative well-being are more than opposite ends of the same
phenomenon. Two separate measures of the dependent variable may therefore be needed
when analyzing the determinants of subjective well-being. We investigate asymmetries in
the effect of income on subjective well-being with a single-item measure of general life
satisfaction. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2004, and a flexible
multiple-index ordered probit panel data model with varying thresholds, we find that income
has only a minor effect on high satisfaction but significantly reduces dissatisfaction.
Keywords Generalized ordered probit model  Marginal probability effects 
Random effects  Fixed effects  Life-satisfaction
1 Introduction
Pinning down the income elasticity of subjective well-being is one of the great challenges
in the emerging field of the economics of happiness (Layard 2005; Frey and Stutzer 2002;
Bruni and Porta 2006). If this line of research is to have a lasting impact on economic
policy making, a reliable estimate, and understanding, of the effect of income on well-
being (the extent to which ‘‘money can buy happiness’’) will be a litmus test. The recent
survey by Clark et al. (2006) bears witness to the intensive empirical economic research
undertaken in this area.
The emotional model theory of subjective well-being, developed in the early 1980s by
psychologist Ed Diener, posits that individuals’ appraisals of their own lives (i.e., a per-
son’s individual judgment about his current status in the world) capture the essence of
well-being (Diener 1984; Diener et al. 1985, 1999). The literature has identified three core
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components of subjective well-being: positive affect, (the lack of) negative affect, and
general life satisfaction (i.e., subjective appreciation of life’s rewards), separable con-
structs that can be independently examined. Together these three capture a broad range of
hedonic and eudemonic experiences.
An important early result, sometimes referred to as ‘‘well-being paradox‘‘, is that average
satisfaction in a country does not increase as countries grow wealthier (Easterlin 1974, 1995).
At the individual level, there is a weak positive cross-sectional association between income
and satisfaction. If one follows an individual over the life-cycle however, as income first
increases and then levels off, subjective well-being remains unchanged. Income expectations
and aspirations matter, which means that the effect is subject to habituation and comparison
(Diener and Biswas Diener 2002; Clark and Oswald 1996; Luttmer 2005). As expected, the
estimated effects differ somewhat depending on whether long-term or short-term income
fluctuations are considered, whether truly exogenous variation in income is available, how
exactly subjective well-being is measured, and what other controls are included in the model.
The contribution of our paper is to explore, for general life satisfaction (GLS), whether the
effect of income is different in different parts of the satisfaction distribution. Is it perhaps the
case that the effect of income differs for persons who are relatively dissatisfied, relative to
those who report a high life satisfaction, regardless of income? Such a finding would not only
improve our understanding of the mechanism underlying the GLS responses, but also add
another explanation to why the overall effect is rather small although income may have a
substantial effect for parts of the population. Any evaluation of the well-being consequences
of economic policies would need to account for such response asymmetries.
We should briefly elaborate on what we mean by ‘‘asymmetries’’. In the traditional inter-
pretation of the single item GLS scale, satisfaction is just the absence of dissatisfaction. In this
view, the effect of income on satisfaction is equal to minus the effect of income on dissatis-
faction. We avoid such a cardinal interpretation and rather focus on the ordering. For simplicity,
consider the case where the GLS scale has only three categories: ‘‘satisfied’’, ‘‘neutral’’ and
‘‘dissatisfied’’.1 The model we consider does not impose a priori that factors increasing the
probability of satisfaction must also reduce the probability of dissatisfaction, and vice versa.
This is new, as far as we can tell, although there have been a number of related approaches.
Huppert and Whittington (2003) use the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-30) to
identify positive items. The score on these positive items is then labeled ‘‘positive well-
being’’, whereas a standard symptom measure of psychological distress, also from the
GHQ-30, is used for ‘‘negative well-being’’. Similarly, Headey and Wooden (2004)
compare well-being from a GLS question (as used in our paper) with ill-being obtained
from a 5-item scale on mental health (i.e., capturing anxiety, depression, and the like).
These studies therefore do not investigate differences in the effects of a variable, such as
income, at different poles of the same scale. Our approach also differs from the large
literature on positive and negative affect, spurred by Bradburn (1969), since we focus on
global life satisfaction, a person’s conscious evaluative judgment of life, rather than affect.
With data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2004, we find that income
significantly reduces the incidence of low satisfaction but it does not increase the incidence
of high satisfaction in a subsample of men living in one-person households. This finding
corroborates previous evidence of asymmetric effects from multi-item analyses of sub-
jective well-being, this time with a single-item measure of general life satisfaction.
1 The question we actually use is a response to ‘‘How satisfied are you with your life, all things consid-
ered?’’ on an 11-point numerical scale, where ‘‘0’’ is labeled ‘‘completely dissatisfied’’ and ‘‘10’’ is labeled
‘‘completely satisfied’’.
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2 Happiness and Income in Economics
For economists, empirical evidence on the relationship between income and subjective
well-being (SWB) is important for (at least) two reasons. First, the design and evaluation of
economic policies often takes income as the target quantity of interest. The idea is, of
course, that income is a good proxy for well-being, and that it is easy to measure. If the link
between income and well-being is less strong than suspected, then economic policies based
on income (or GDP) maximization alone may turn out to be inferior from an overall well-
being perspective.
Second, the relationship between income and well-being may be used to put a monetary
value—or shadow price—on non-traded goods, usually in the context of cost-benefit
analyses. The basic idea is one of compensation: in case of a ‘‘bad’’, how much of an
increase in income is required to offset the negative effect of the bad, while keeping the
person at the same level of SWB as in the absence of the bad? Similarly, in case of a good,
one can implicitly determine the shadow price by asking how much income a person would
be willing to give up in order to obtain the good, keeping SWB fixed.
Examples for this line of research are Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), who estimate the
pecuniary value of a lasting marriage (relative to widowhood) to be $ 100,000 per year. Other
examples include Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who estimate the money-equivalent
value of the psychological cost of unemployment, a trade-off that we will come back to
below, and Schwarze (2003) who uses the principle to determine an income equivalence
scale, i.e., the income compensation required to keep the same level of an individual’s well-
being with one additional household member present. Frey et al. (2004) estimate the value of
public safety, or the absence of terrorism. Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) measure the
external cost of air traffic noise for people living near the Amsterdam Airport.
Unfortunately, the implied compensation may be sensitive to the chosen model, and too
restrictive assumptions may lead to spurious estimates. An obvious concern is that the same
income change has a different meaning for poor than for rich people. This concern resonates
throughout the literature. Typically, it is found that the correlation between income and
subjective well-being is much stronger among the poor. While the absence of poverty does
not guarantee happiness, the presence often prevents it (Diener and Biswas Diener 2002).
Such non-linearities can be addressed, for instance, by studying the correlation between
GLS and logarithmic income. In this case, a proportionate effect is assumed: To achieve the
same increase in satisfaction, larger and larger absolute changes in income are necessary.
Semi-parametric estimators have provided some support for a log-linear functional form.
The topic of our paper is different. Not all poor people are dissatisfied with their lives,
nor are all wealthy people satisfied. The general life satisfaction scale integrates the
subjects’ reflected valuation of various domains of their lives, weighting them in whatever
way they choose (Van Praag et al. 2003). In the broadest sense, one can distinguish two
domains, a pecuniary domain and a non-pecuniary domain (that includes, perhaps most
importantly, health and social relationships). Our working hypothesis is that the non-
pecuniary domain moderates the effect of the pecuniary domain on GLS. Specifically, if
the valuation of the non-pecuniary domain contributes to a low GLS, then the effect of the
pecuniary domain becomes stronger, i.e., an income increase will have a more favorable
effect on GLS, compared to the case where the non-pecuniary domain leads to a high GLS
score. Such a framework will lead to the aforementioned response asymmetries: income
will lower dissatisfaction more than it will increase satisfaction.
To test this hypothesis, we cannot use conventional regression or ordered response
models, because in these models the effect of income at various satisfaction levels cannot
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be estimated freely but rather is dictated by functional form, essentially a single parameter.
A naive approach would be to split the scale, for example by defining the outcomes
‘‘dissatisfied’’ for scores below an arbitrary cut-off, and ‘‘satisfied‘‘ for values above an
arbitrary cut-off, and analyzing their response patterns separately. Slightly more sophis-
ticated approaches can be based either on a latent class framework, or on generalized
ordered probit models as proposed here.
In latent class models, one can define any number of latent groups and estimate the
effect of income conditional on group membership. A recent example for such an approach
is the study by Clark et al. (2005) who used GLS data from the European Community
Household Panel. They found that the effect of income changes were larger in the ‘‘latent
satisfied’’ than in the ‘‘latent dissatisfied’’ classes. Here we address the issue from a
different angle: Rather than inferring response asymmetries from unobservable class
membership, we model them directly using an alternative approach with outcome-specific
parameters, a generalized ordered probit model for panel data. The technical details of the
model are discussed in the next section.
3 Econometric Modeling
Most empirical work on the determinants of subjective well-being uses either linear
regression or single-index ordered probit and logit models. While the latter account for the
discreteness and ordering of the dependent variable, they impose an implicit cardinaliza-
tion such that, for example, the trade-off ratios between income and other determinants of
well-being must be constant across the distribution of outcomes (Boes and Winkelmann
2006). Since we want to estimate unrestricted income effects for low and high levels of
well-being, we need to use more flexible models, and the multinomial logit with its multi-
index structure is certainly one option. However, this model does not make any use of the
ordering information and therefore cannot be efficient. We propose instead a generalization
of Maddala’s (1983) and Terza’s (1985) model to panel data, a model that is as flexible as
the multinomial logit model and in addition accounts for the ordinality.
3.1 Model and Assumptions
Let Yit [{1,..., J} denote the survey response to the GLS question of individual i = 1,..., n
at time t = 1,..., Ti, and let Xit denote the vector of covariates (including logarithmic
income). The relationship between Yit and Xit is specified in terms of cumulative condi-
tional probabilities:
PðYit  yjXit; hyÞ ¼ UðX0ithyÞ y ¼ 1; . . .; J  1 ð1Þ
where U() denotes the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution, and hy
denotes a vector of category-specific parameters, including a constant.2 The function U()
maps the linear index onto the unit interval, and we require h = (h1 ... hJ-1) to fulfill the
strict inequalities X0ith1 [    [ X0ithJ1 such that the cumulative probabilities increase
with each increment in y. Due to adding up P(Yit B J|Xit) = 1, so that we can only identify
2 For the ease of exposition, we set up the model in terms of cumulative conditional probabilities. Like the
standard ordered probit, the generalized model may also be motivated in terms of a latent variable and a
threshold crossing mechanism generating the ordinal response variable. We refer to Winkelmann and Boes
(2006, Chap. 6) for a detailed outline of the underlying assumptions and identification issues in this
framework.
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J-1 category-specific parameter vectors. The model reduces to the standard ordered probit
model if only the constant term in hy is category-specific.
In order to exploit the advantages of panel data more fully, the model can be augmented
by individual specific time invariant effects. Conditioning on such effects avoids bias if, for
example, unobserved personality traits affect well-being as well as observable character-
istics (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Let gi denote such individual effects, and
rewrite the cumulative probabilities (1) conditional on gi as
PðYit  yjXit; gi; hyÞ ¼ UðX0ithy  giÞ y ¼ 1; . . .; J  1 ð2Þ
We assume that Xit is strictly exogenous conditional on gi and that outcomes are inde-
pendent conditional on (Xi, gi), where Xi contains Xit for all t. The first assumption rules out
lagged dependent variables in Xit, the second assumption allows for dependencies in Yit
across t if conditioned only on Xi. Note that the independence assumption restricts the
covariance matrix of individual effects to be diagonal, i.e., Covðgi; gi0 Þ ¼ 08i 6¼ i0:
Without specifying the relationship between Xit and gi, i.e., treating gi as fixed
parameters to be estimated along with h, a model based on (2) will suffer from the
incidental parameters problem. For fixed time and large cross-sectional dimension, the
number of parameters gi is unbounded, with available information on gi being fixed, which
in general yields inconsistent estimators of gi and h. We solve this problem by treating gi as
random variable drawn along with (Xi, Yi). Following the idea of Chamberlain (1980) and
Mundlak (1978) we allow for possible correlation between gi and Xi:
gi ¼ X0icþ ai ð3Þ
where Xi is the vector of averages of Xit over time, c is a conformable parameter vector,
and ai is an orthogonal error with aijXi Normalð0; r2aÞ:3 The distributional assumption
and the independence ensure that the correlation matrix of the random effects is the
identity matrix. If we replace gi in (2) by (3), then we obtain
PðYit  yjXit; Xi; ai; hy; cÞ ¼ UðX0ithy  X0ic aiÞ y ¼ 1; . . .; J  1 ð4Þ
or in terms of a conditional probability model for all y = 1,..., J
PðYit ¼ yjXit; Xi; ai; h; cÞ ¼ UðX0ithy  X0ic aiÞ  UðX0ithy1  X0ic aiÞ ð5Þ
where ai is the individual specific time invariant random effect, and it is understood that
UðX0ith0  X0ic aiÞ ¼ 0 and UðX0ithJ  X0ic aiÞ ¼ 1: The joint distribution of
Yi = (Yi1,..., YiT_i) conditional on observables but unconditional on ai is obtained by
integrating the joint distribution of Yi and ai over ai, formally
f ðyijxi; xi; h; c; raÞ ¼
Z1
1
YTi
t¼1
YJ
y¼1
Pðyit ¼ yjxit; xi; ai; h; cÞ1ðyit¼yÞ 1ra /
ai
ra
 
dai ð6Þ
where 1() is the indicator function. The inner product over all J categories selects the
appropriate likelihood contribution for each observation (individual i at time t) according
to the observed category, and the independence of Yit conditional on Xi and ai ensures that
the joint probability of (Yi1,..., YiJ)|(Xi,ai) can be written as the product of single
3 A straightforward generalization of (3) would be to let c vary by the satisfaction levels, i.e., replace c by
cy. Computationally somewhat more involved would be to let ai vary by the satisfaction level. Note that only
time-varying covariates are included in Xi because otherwise hy and c would not be separately identified.
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probabilities over all periods Ti. The integral in (6) does not have a closed form solution,
but it can be rewritten in a form amenable to Gauss-Hermite quadrature for numerical
approximation.
Estimation of parameters by maximum likelihood is straightforward once the integral
has been evaluated, and the resulting estimator is consistent, efficient, and approximately
normally distributed. The generalized ordered probit model with random effects specifi-
cation has been implemented in a new Stata module calledregoprob available via thessc
commands in Stata.4
3.2 Interpretation of the Model
There are a number of ways to interpret the estimated parameters, but we focus here on two
quantities that offer a very intuitive interpretation when dealing with conditional proba-
bility models. First, we may ask the question ‘‘How does a small ceteris paribus change in
income affect the distribution of GLS responses?’’ which is answered by marginal prob-
ability effects (MPE’s). Such effects are of particular interest for the asymmetry hypothesis
since we are able to identify whether income effects on GLS differ for low and high GLS.
Second, we may look at asymmetric effects from a different (probability) angle insofar as
we do not investigate the change in the GLS distribution at different poles, but instead we
keep the GLS distribution fixed and analyze income changes required to compensate for a
change in another covariate, thereby distinguishing between trade-offs for low and high
GLS.
MPE’s are defined as first derivatives of (5) with respect to the variable(s) of interest.
Since ai is an unobserved random variable, we cannot directly calculate the MPE’s without
further assumptions. One possibility would be to take advantage of the probit form and the
normality of ai and rewrite the conditional probabilities marginal on ai as
PðYit ¼ yjXit; Xi; h; c; raÞ ¼U X
0
ithy  X0icﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 þ r2a
p
 !
 U X
0
ithy1  X0icﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 þ r2a
p
 !
¼U X0it#y  X0iw
  U X0it#y1  X0iw 
ð7Þ
where #y ¼ hyð1 þ r2aÞ1=2 and w ¼ cð1 þ r2aÞ1=2 denote the population-averaged coef-
ficient vectors. The coefficients are called population-averaged since they are obtained as
the expectation of (5) over ai. Taking derivatives of (7) yields
MPEðlÞy ¼
oPðYit ¼ yjXit; Xi;#;wÞ
oXðlÞit
¼/ðX0it#y1  Xi0wÞ#ðlÞy1  /ðX0it#y  X0iwÞ#ðlÞy
ð8Þ
where /() denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution, and XðlÞit
denotes the l-th element in Xit (here assumed to be logarithmic income) and #
ðlÞ
y the
corresponding scaled (income) coefficient. The difference between the standard ordered
probit model and the generalized model becomes apparent in Eq. 8: while the generalized
model allows for different parameter vectors #y for all y = 1,..., J-1, the standard model
restricts those parameters to be the same. Thus, the generalized model allows for additional
4 Stata is a registered trademark of StataCorp, College Station TX, USA. Typenet search regoprob or ssc
install regoprob in the command line of Stata to find out more about regoprob. See also the documentation
of regoprob for details on the command syntax and the output generated by Stata.
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flexibility in estimating marginal probability effects. For example, the implied effect of a
change in one element of X on the probability of border outcomes, P(Y = 1|X) and
P(Y = J|X), can have equal sign in the generalized model but not in the standard one (see
Boes and Winkelmann 2006, for further discussion). Note that the MPE’s are functions of
the covariates and therefore depend on the values of Xit and Xi. We estimate the MPE’s
replacing the unknown coefficients by the maximum likelihood estimates and evaluating at
the sample averages of the regressors.
The second quantity of interest, the trade-off ratio, assesses the importance of income
relative to other determinants. It follows from totally differentiating (7) that
dPðYit ¼ yjXit; Xi;#;wÞ ¼ MPEðlÞy dXðlÞit þ MPEðmÞy dXðmÞit ð9Þ
where X
ðlÞ
it denotes logarithmic income, X
ðmÞ
it denotes any other covariate in Xit, and the
MPE’s are given by (8). The approximation in (9) directly leads to the concept of com-
pensating variation: How much of a variation in one regressor (here income) is needed to
offset the given change in another regressor such that dPðYit ¼ yjXit; Xi;#;wÞ ¼ 08y; i.e.,
all probabilities remain unchanged. Rearranging terms yields
dX
ðlÞ
it
dX
ðmÞ
it
¼ MPE
ðmÞ
y
MPE
ðlÞ
y
ð10Þ
In the standard model, this trade-off ratio reduces to the ratio of coefficients, i.e., we obtain
dX
ðlÞ
it =dX
ðmÞ
it ¼ #ðmÞ=#ðlÞ; which does not vary across outcomes, whereas in the generalized
model such an restriction is not imposed. Rather, we can let the data speak and determine
empirically how these trade-off ratios look like.
4 Data
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a large annual panel survey of randomly
selected households in Germany (see Burkhauser et al. 2001 for more details). Personal
information is available for all household members aged 16 and above. Our data are drawn
from the West German (A) subsample 1984–2004, yielding a maximum of 21 observations
per individual (on average about five observations per individual). We apply a number of
standard selection criteria: included individuals are between 25 and 65 years old at the time
of the survey, and we require non-missing information on all the included variables.5
In addition, we employ a novel restriction by considering single person households
only. The rationale for this selection is that the match between reported household income
and individual material well-being is much better in single-person households than we
could possibly hope for in a multi-person household. General household surveys such as
the GSOEP typically include two types of income measures, one being total household
income (from all sources), the other being personal labor earnings. Clearly, personal labor
earnings are not a very good indicator of material well-being, in particular, but not only, for
persons who do not work, as it does not include any government transfers (e.g., child
benefit, government grants, or rent subsidies). Household income (net of taxes and social
security contributions) is in general a more appropriate measure. However, in multi-person
5 The variables we include in the model generally have very high response rates with missing information
for only a few respondents, in particular for the GLS variable, so that we do not expect significant bias in the
results from dropping these observations.
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households, there remain two types of ambiguities. First, there is an ongoing debate on the
right equivalence scale in order to reflect economies of scale in household production and
consumption. Secondly, we do not know whether resources are shared evenly within the
household, but such an (arbitrary) assumption is required when assigning one income to
several household members.
For these reasons, we find it instructive to study the relationship between income and
SWB in the (reference) population of single person households. We do not claim that such
a sample is representative for the whole population, and of course, this raises the question
of external validity: To what extent can results for single person households be extrapo-
lated to the population of all households? While single person households are non-
representative with respect to a number of factors (such as age, and possibly also income),
we controlled for this in our analysis, and it is a priori unclear why the well-being function
(after including these factors) should be different for such persons. In fact, Mentzakis and
Moro (2009) provide evidence in favor of the asymmetry hypothesis adopting similar
methods as the ones proposed here in a sample of multi-person households.
All in all, this approach leaves us with 5,008 person-year observations for men, and with
4,727 person-year observations for women. The dependent variable is, as mentioned
before, the response to the survey question ‘‘How satisfied are you with your life, all things
considered?’’. There are relatively few responses in the 0–2 range. For this reason, and to
preserve some degrees of freedom (a full set of regression parameters is added for each
additional category), we use a modified scale where the original 0–2 responses have been
grouped into the lowest ‘‘dissatisfied‘‘ category.
Figure 1 depicts the frequency distribution of GLS responses in our sample, separately
for men and women. Most people are satisfied with their life: about two thirds report a GLS
level of seven or higher, and women have a slightly higher average GLS level than men.
The distribution in Fig. 1 is characteristic of most SWB distributions in the sense that the
majority of people reports a relatively high level of GLS, although the highest response
category is chosen relatively infrequently.
In the regression analysis, control variables include—apart from logarithmic income—a
second order polynomial in age and dummy variables for unemployment and health status.
We use a relatively simple specification with only a few variables. This has two main
advantages. First, since eight regression parameters are estimated for each variable, fewer
regressors keep the model manageable. Second, many of the additional variables used in
Fig. 1 Marginal distribution of
satisfaction responses
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the previous literature are arguably endogenous choice variables, obstructing the inter-
pretation of the results. Finally, all analyses are performed separately by gender.
Table 1 summarizes the sample means of the explanatory variables. Among one-person
households, men have a significantly higher monthly income than women (about 260
Euros) and are on average more than 5 years younger. The unemployment rate is about
2.5% points higher for men than for women, and 58.2% of the women are relatively
satisfied with their health status (compared to 65.6% of the men). These variations can
largely be explained by the different age distributions of single male and single female
households. Men are mostly living alone when they are young and at the beginning of their
career path. Women are more likely to live alone when they are older, contributing factors
being a higher incidence of widowhood due to greater life-expectancy.
Table 2 cross-tabulates the sample means of the dependent variable conditional on the
GLS response, again separately for men and women. The income variable shows a lot of
variation along the GLS dimension. For men (panel A), the lowest average monthly
income (1,124 Euro) is observed for individuals with very low GLS, the highest income
(1519 Euro) for those with response ‘‘8’’. When moving from the utmost left part of the
GLS distribution to the right, average income is first increasing then decreasing. A similar
pattern can be observed for women (panel B), although on a lower level. Concerning
unemployment and health, we find that among less satisfied people the unemployment rate
is relatively high and that reported health status and GLS are positively correlated.
5 Estimation Results
In this section, we report on the estimation results of the relationship between income and
subjective well-being, the latter measured by general life satisfaction. We first present the
estimated income parameters under several model assumptions, then turn our attention to
the implications with respect to the asymmetry hypothesis, and finally discuss the
robustness of our results.
We estimated two different models: A random effects ordered probit model (OProbit)
including group means as additional regressors, and a generalized random effects ordered
probit model (GOProbit), also including group means, where all parameters are outcome-
specific. In both cases, the pooled models were clearly rejected against the panel models,
which is reflected in Table 3 where we report the estimated variances (and standard errors)
of the random effects, r^2a; separately for men and women. Furthermore, a joint significance
test of the group means as additional regressors rejected the null hypothesis of zero
correlation, and thus a simple random effects specification without Xi is rejected by the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics by gender
Variable Men Women
Mean SE Mean SE
Monthly income in EUR 1403.5 12.0 1140.9 10.3
Age in years 40.24 0.16 45.80 0.20
Unemployment (0/1) 0.083 0.004 0.058 0.003
Good health (0/1) 0.656 0.007 0.582 0.007
Number of obs. 5,008 4,727
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data as well. These tests suggest that individual heterogeneity should be accounted for in
the SWB equation.
Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients on logarithmic income and unemployment
separately for men (panel A) and women (panel B). Although the raw parameters are not
very interesting per se, the comparison is useful for understanding our later results. For
men, we find a positive and significant income parameter in the standard model (0.362 with
z-value 6.67). In the generalized model, eight different parameters vectors h1,..., h8 are
estimated (where each vector contains coefficients for all the explanatory variables). The
income coefficients are slightly higher for the parameter vectors h1 to h6 than the overall
estimate in the standard model. The point estimate decreases but is still significant for h7,
and finally turns negative and insignificant for h8. The estimated coefficients in the sample
of women are smaller (in absolute value) and less significant than those for men indicating
a weaker relative impact. For example, in the standard model we obtain an income point
estimate of 0.131, which is only about a third of that for men, and the z-value decreases to
1.97. In the generalized model the income coefficients are significant on the 5%-level only
for h4 and h5, while all other income coefficients are insignificant. For the unemployment
coefficient in the subsample of men we obtain point estimates for low/high satisfaction that
are smaller/higher (in absolute terms) than the overall estimate in the standard model, for
women we observe the opposite pattern.
If we formally test the generalized ordered probit model against the standard model, we
can reject the null hypothesis of equal slope parameters for men (LR203 = 548.9) and for
Table 2 Sample means by gender and satisfaction level
Variable GLS level
0–2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A. Men
Relative freq. 4.21% 3.63% 4.61% 12.98% 12.26% 24.44% 26.68% 7.53% 3.65%
Income 1123.9 1152.0 1414.3 1255.8 1324.0 1477.9 1519.3 1473.6 1267.8
Age 43.86 41.83 41.07 43.55 40.32 38.99 38.91 38.19 43.79
Unemployment 0.336 0.176 0.182 0.126 0.103 0.056 0.030 0.029 0.022
Good health 0.336 0.319 0.338 0.340 0.549 0.732 0.841 0.897 0.896
B. Women
Relative freq. 3.07% 3.24% 3.81% 14.45% 10.98% 19.93% 27.99% 9.99% 6.56%
Income 930.5 935.4 1047.4 978.1 1055.7 1196.7 1238.6 1290.7 1082.1
Age 47.50 45.75 45.59 49.28 46.25 43.37 44.62 45.34 49.84
Unemployment 0.234 0.124 0.172 0.089 0.052 0.036 0.039 0.013 0.035
Good health 0.159 0.196 0.267 0.274 0.420 0.601 0.767 0.847 0.845
Table 3 Estimated variances of the random effects by gender and model
OProbit GOProbit
Men 0.785 (0.184) 0.833 (0.212)
Women 0.666 (0.150) 0.708 (0.164)
Notes: The models are the ordered probit (OProbit) and the generalized ordered probit (GOProbit).
Estimated standard errors in parentheses
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women (LR203 = 430.1). The null hypothesis of equal income coefficients is also rejected
for both, men and women, equal unemployment coefficients is only rejected for women.
This result suggests that parameters are heterogeneous with respect to the outcome
distribution.
In order to interpret the estimated parameters and evaluate the effects of income on low
and high GLS we now turn to the quantities introduced in Sect. 3 and the marginal
probabilities first. Table 5, Figs. 2 and 3 summarize the MPE’s of income and unem-
ployment by gender. Consider, for example, the results for men and take the ceteris paribus
effect of an increase in logarithmic household income by a small amount on the probability
of responding a GLS level of ‘‘8’’ (equal interpretation applies to the effects at all other
GLS levels). Table 5 shows a value of 0.059 for the standard model. This means that the
probability of a response of ‘‘8’’ increases by 0.059% points if we increase logarithmic
income by 0.01, which corresponds approximately to a 1% increase in level income. A
doubling of income, i.e., a change in logarithmic income by 0.693, increases the proba-
bility of response ‘‘8’’ by about 0.059 9 0.693 9 100, or about 4.09% points, ceteris
paribus.
Comparing the MPE’s among the standard and the generalized models and over all
possible outcomes, we obtain the following pattern. For men all models suggest that more
income significantly reduces the probability of low GLS (0–5), and significantly increases
the probability of response ‘‘8’’. For high GLS responses (9–10), the standard model
predicts a significant positive effect, whereas the generalized model does not predict an
effect significantly different from zero. Thus, based on the generalized ordered probit
model, there is no evidence for income to have an effect on high satisfaction. Moreover,
the effect of income is asymmetric: higher income decreases the probability of dissatis-
faction, but it does not affect the probability of high satisfaction. Figure 2 illustrates the
asymmetric effects and shows the differences between the MPE’s in the standard ordered
probit model and the generalized ordered probit model.
For women the relationship between income and GLS is relatively weak. While the
standard model finds small but significant effects for low and high GLS, the generalized
model predicts a significant negative effect only for responses ‘‘5’’ and ‘‘6’’. Concerning
unemployment, we find evidence for men that an increased unemployment probability
reduces the probability of response ‘‘8’’, or higher, and increases the probability of low
responses, but the relationship for women is less clear. For example, an increase in the
probability of being unemployed by 1% point reduces the probability of response ‘‘8’’ by
about 0.096% points for men, and raises the probability of the same outcome by about
0.051% points for women. The gender difference might be explained by social norms that
assign the role of primary income earner to men and therefore make income a relatively
more important determinant of male well-being (e.g., Lalive and Stutzer 2004). Such a
gender difference can also be observed when considering unemployment.
The relationship between GLS, income, and unemployment, for men and women, at
various parts of the GLS distribution can alternatively be illustrated by the trade-off ratios.
Table 6, Figs. 4 and 5 show the required changes in logarithmic income if the unem-
ployment probability increases by one percentage point, given the GLS distribution is
fixed. If we want to interpret the reported numbers, we need to be careful with respect to
the significance of MPE’s. The trade-off ratio does only make sense for significant income
effects. In this case, the required change in income is either zero if the MPE of unem-
ployment is statistically not different from zero, or the change is positive (or negative) for
significant unemployment effects. We marked the four cases (non-sensible/zero/positive/
negative) with =  =þ = :
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Fig. 2 Marginal probability
effects of income—Men
Fig. 3 Marginal probability
effects of income—Women
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The numbers in Table 6 (multiplied by 100) approximate the percentage change in
income, e.g., for men in the standard model a 0.019 means that income must increase by
1.9% to offset the increase in the unemployment probability by 1% point. By construction,
the trade-off ratios in the ordered probit model are constant for all levels of GLS, and
interpretation therefore is not particularly interesting. In the generalized model, required
income changes vary between 0.6 and 4.2%. An important observation is that income
compensations are entirely ineffective for men with high GLS, and effective for medium to
low satisfied men, though in an unsystematic way. For women, a compensation for
unemployment in terms of income is rather unpromising, and other factors determining
GLS need to be identified when looking for effective compensation schemes. Figures 4 and
5 provide a graphical illustration of the results.
While these results are obtained for a specific sample and a specific parametric model
with its set of assumptions, we found a remarkable robustness of the main conclusions with
respect to alternative specifications and samples. Possible alternatives include the use of
different link functions (rather than the probit ones), including the logit, the log-logistic,
and the complementary log–log; we estimated a series of binary models, where the
dependent variables result from dichotomization of GLS responses, i.e., Yit [ 2 against Yit
B 2, Yit [ 3 against Yit B 3, and so on; and conditioning on fixed effects using Cham-
berlain’s (1982) conditional logit model. Alternative link functions did not provide a better
fit, nor did the response asymmetry for men disappear under the alternative model
assumptions.
Fig. 4 Compensating variation
in income—Men
Fig. 5 Compensating variation
in income—Women
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6 Conclusion
The distinction between positive and negative well-being has been made for some time
now. Huppert and Whittington (2003) point out that the determinants of positive and
negative well-being are not necessarily the same. For example, in their study of partici-
pants in the British Health and Lifestyle Survey, paid employment was found to be an
important determinant of positive well-being but to have less influence on psychological
symptoms. Headey and Wooden (2004) use also two separate measures of well-being and
ill-being. In their case, the pecuniary situation, captured through income and wealth, was
found to affect both aspects equally.
Our paper takes a different approach. We also study the determinants of well-being, in
particular the effect of income. However, we use a single item scale of general life
satisfaction, where low scores are interpreted as a state of ‘‘dissatisfaction’’ and high scores
signify ‘‘satisfaction’’. There are a number of advantages of such a single measure. It is
widely available, and it allows for a straightforward computation of compensating income
variations, an important application of this type of modeling in economics. We therefore
propose a new and very flexible panel data model in which we can analyze whether income
effects depend on the level of satisfaction. The model allows for individual specific effects
and outcome-specific parameters, i.e., the effect of income on GLS may be non-monotonic.
In a sample of single-person households drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
waves 1984 to 2004, we find support for the existence of asymmetric income effects for
men. Based on our results, income has a large effect among men with low GLS responses,
but no effect on men with high GLS responses. For women in single-person households
income plays a minor role in the formation of GLS, and support of the asymmetry
hypothesis is rather weak.
Clearly, more research is needed in this area. We think that our methodological focus on
flexible estimation of marginal probability effects and trade-off ratios with a single mea-
sure of well-being, namely general life satisfaction, should prove useful in further
investigations. If one wants to estimate marginal probability effects and compensating
variations in a meaningful way, then one should use the generalized ordered probit model
rather than the simpler models prevailing in earlier research.
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